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Fighting Yesterday's Battles: Proposed Changes to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
I. INTRODUCTION

"Congressman, you are causing problems," Ms. Warren
said. "We had an agreement." "You're making this up,"
Mr. McHenry replied, eliciting gasps from the audience.
"This is not the case." As Mr. McHenry and Ms. Warren
traded accusations, a senior Democrat, Representative
Elijah Cummings of Maryland, tried to smooth things
over. "Mr. Chairman," he said, "I'm trying to be cordial
here - you just accused the lady of lying."'
The partisan exchange has sunk to unfortunate lows as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has materialized. Although
the CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which was enacted on July 21,
2010, and it officially opened for business on July 21, 2011, some
members of Congress continue to insist that its structure needs revisiting. They say that the CFPB's powers go beyond making financial
products digestible for consumers because not only would it burden
consumer credit providers with unnecessary regulations, but it could also prevent them from creating new products.3 Others believe that the
CFPB is American consumers' only administrative counterweight to the
prudential regulators 4 who some think have mostly aligned with busi1. Edward Wyatt, Decorum Breaks Down at House Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2011, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/business/25consume.html?_r-1.2; Christopher Maag,
What The Government's New Consumer Watchdog Means For You, BusINESS INSIDER (July
22, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-the-govemments-new-consumerwatchdog-means-for-you-2011-7 [hereinafter New Consumer Watchdog].
3. Christopher Maag, Post Warren, the Battle Over the CFPB is Far From Over,
CREDIT, (July 18, 2011), http://www.credit.com/blog/2011/07/remember-the-financialreform-fight-its-far-from-over/.
4. The term prudential regulator means "in the case of an insured depository institu-
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ness interests.5 These supporters assert that the CFPB will be instrumental in preventing a systemic collapse like the one in 2008.6 The debate has been nothing if not heated.
The source of the debate traces back to the origins of the recent
financial crisis (hereinafter "the 2008 crisis"). Congressional proponents of the CFPB tend to place more blame for the 2008 crisis on the
financial institutions' risky practices. The CFPB's detractors point the
finger at government interference in the mortgage industry and believe
that government is not equipped to solve the problem. 8 These detractors
have proposed a number of bills to adjust the CFPB to reflect their position. 9
This Note will analyze the proposed changes to the CFPB. Although it is difficult to say exactly what the implications of such adjustments would be, they almost certainly would subordinate consumer interests to nearly the same level at which they stood prior to the passage
of Dodd-Frank. This Note will explain why some of the proposed
changes go beyond mere structural tweaks to the CFPB and instead
serve to undermine the CFPB before it even has a chance to prove its
worth.

tion or depository institution holding company . .. or subsidiary of such institution or company, the appropriate Federal banking agency." 12 U.S.C. § 5481(24) (Supp. IV 2010).
5. See Enhanced Consumer FinancialProtectionAfter the FinancialCrisis: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Enhanced], availableat http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=1 980c90b-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a (statement of
Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center).
6. Id.
7. New Consumer Watchdog, supra note 2; see also Bill Thomas et al., What Caused
the Financial Crisis? Congress's Inquiry Commission Is Offering a Simplistic Narrative
that Could Lead to the Wrong Policy Reforms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011 [hereinafter What
Caused
the
Financial
Crisis?],
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704698004576104500524998280.html
(noting that the risky practices included: providing nontraditional mortgages that were deceptive, confusing, and often unaffordable for borrowers; midsize to large financial firms
amassing vast concentrations of highly correlated housing risk; holding insufficient capital
relative to the risks and using short term debt to fund them).
8. New Consumer Watchdog, supra note 2; see also What Caused the Financial Crisis?, supra note 7 (describing the government's ineffective regulation of the primary mortgage market as a major factor in causing the 2008 financial crisis).
9. See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act
of 2011, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011); The Communities First Act of 2011, H.R.
1697, 112th Cong. (2011); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of
2011, S. 737, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
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Part II will briefly summarize the consumer-oriented factors that
contributed to the 2008 crisis and how these factors revealed a need for
reform.10 It will review the beginnings of the CFPB and its current
structure."
Part III describes the Congressional proposals to change the review of CFPB rulemaking, the CFPB's leadership structure, and the
CFPB's funding. 12 This section will explain the reasons for these proposals and their implications.' 3
Finally, Part IV will elaborate on why the CFPB should mostly
remain as it stands today, reviewing the problems that existed before
consumer protection became a priority and comparing the CFPB to its
administrative peers.14
II. THE CFPB's ROUGH ROAD TO EXISTENCE
A.

The 2008 FinancialCrisis

There were many causes to the 2008 crisis, but some of the primary causes were unscrupulous business practices in investment banking and structured finance, inflated credit ratings, high risk lending in
the mortgage market, and regulatory inaction.' 5 However, these factors
did not operate in a vacuum, but instead tended to enable and magnify
the impact of one another. Shortsighted lending practices grew in the
1990s as subprime lenders placed consumers into homes that those consumers could not afford.16 Federal regulators, like the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB), that were charged with tracking these abusive practices
failed to intervene or enact appropriate regulations to ensure that home

10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Press Release, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Investigations Subcomm. Releases Levin-Coburn Report on the Fin. Crisis (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord
id=5 1BF2C79-5056-8059-76AO-6674916El 33D.
16. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for
Responsible Lending).
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owners could afford their mortgages.17 In so failing, the regulators perpetuated this downward spiral, leaving mortgagors, shareholders, taxpayers, and many others floundering in a broken system.' 8
B.

A New Agency for Consumers

Following the 2008 crisis and the failures of the various offending parties, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, which created the CFPB.19
The CFPB's mission is to ensure that:
(1) Consumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions
about financial transactions; (2) consumers are protected
from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices, and
from discrimination; (3) outdated, unnecessary, or overly burdensome regulations are regularly identified and
addressed in order to reduce unwarranted regulatory
burdens; (4) Federal consumer financial law is enforced
consistently, without regard to the status of a person as a
depository institution, in order to promote fair competition; and (5) markets for consumer financial products
and services operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation.20
Leading up to the 2008 crisis, many of the prudential regulators
who were supposed to ensure the safety and soundness 2 1 of financial institutions and overall market stability, focused almost exclusively on the
former. 22 By protecting the profitability of the banks to the exclusion of
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.

19. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010).
20. Id § 5511.
21. Safety and soundness has been defined by "[s]ection 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), [which] requires each Federal banking agency (collectively, the
agencies) to establish certain safety and soundness standards by regulation or by guideline
for all insured depository institutions. Under section 39, the agencies must establish three
types of standards: (1) Operational and managerial standards; (2) compensation standards;
and (3) such standards relating to asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation as they determine to be appropriate." 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. A (2011).
22. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for
Responsible Lending).
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the consumer interests, these agencies failed to appreciate the symbiotic
relationship between the two. 2 3 The CFPB's existence is recognition of
that failure because, by creating it, Congress shifted the responsibilities
for consumer protection away from the regulators whose focus had been
safety and soundness to an agency whose mission is to represent the interests of the consumer.24
Fair practices regulations play a fundamental role in protecting
the economy.25 In the broadest sense, the CFPB's means to that end is
enabling consumers to make informed decisions. 26 For markets to function properly, consumers must have the information they need to make
appropriate financial decisions. 27 Producers will then respond to a demand that is attuned to the modem consumer.28 Today, these fundamental components of marketplace exchange are lacking. 29 Both borrowers and lenders have attested that many of the industry-wide
agreements are confusing and time-consuming. 30 There are improvements to be made on all sides, and the CFPB will analyze feedback
from consumers and financial services providers to assist in that effort.31
Although consumers should be held accountable for their decisions,
they cannot be held accountable for uninformed guesses.32 When an individual takes on financial obligations under certain premises only to be
ambushed by hidden snags, the marketplace suffers.33
23.

Id.

24.

See Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureaul [hereinafter Creating the
Consumer Bureau] (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
25. Who's Watching the Watchmen? Oversight of the Consumer FinancialProtection
Bureau: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs., and the Bailouts of Public and PrivatePrograms, 12th Cong. 3 (2011)
at
available
Watching],
Who's
[hereinafter
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&view--article&id=1297%3A524-2011 -qwhos-watching-the-watchmen-oversight-of-the-consumer-financial-protectionbureauq&catid=34&ltemid=39 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
26. See Creating the Consumer Bureau, supra note 24.
27. Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 4 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
28. Id. at 3-4.
29. See id at 3.
30. See id. at 4.
31.

Learn

About

the

Bureau,

CONSUMER

FINANCIAL

PROTECTION

BUREAU,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
32. See Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 4 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special
Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
33. See id.
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To address these issues, the CFPB has been working to produce
concise and transparent forms34 for common credit products.35 As for
the providers of consumer financial products and services, the CFPB
hopes to ease the regulatory burden-especially for smaller firms,
which often lack the resources to deal with the complex requirements
and paperwork.3 6
1. Structure of the CFPB
Dodd-Frank stipulates that the CFPB will be able to regulate
any entity that "engages in offering or providing a consumer financial
product or service,"37 excluding only a few types of businesses like
merchants, retailers, and others who sell nonfinancial goods or services.38 The CFPB will have rulemaking power for existing consumer
protection laws 39 and will be able to file civil claims against any party
who violates a duly enacted law. 4 0 The CFPB will also have exclusive
supervisory and enforcement powers over "large" financial institutions, 41 defined as those with assets greater than $10 billion. 42 Smaller
institutions will still answer to their traditional safety and soundness
regulators for compliance issues.43
Before the CFPB may propose a rule, it is required to consult
with the prudential regulators, and it will have to publicize 4 4 any objections they might raise.45 Once finalized, all rules that "would put the
safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk" will be subject to
34. See Know Before You Owe, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
35. Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 4-5 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special
Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
36. See id. at 5.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (Supp. IV 2010).
38. Id. § 5517.
39. Id. § 5512.
40. Id. § 5564.
41. Id. §5514.
42. Mike Ferullo, PrudentialRegulators, Consumer Bureau Clarify Supervision, Enforcement Duties, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Nov. 22, 2011 [hereinafter PrudentialRegulators, Consumer Bureau Clarify Supervision].
43. Id.
44. "[T]he Bureau shall include in the [rule] adopting release a description of the objection and the basis for the Bureau decision." 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (Supp. IV 2010).
45. Id. § 5512.
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a veto by two-thirdS46 of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), another new entity created by Dodd-Frank. 4 7 Finally, the
CFPB will be required to provide semi-annual reports to the President
and Congressional committees.48
Despite these various oversight mechanisms, the CFPB still has
a great deal of autonomy. The agency's leadership will be a single director serving a five-year term who may only be removed for cause.
Furthermore, as an agency within the FRB, the CFPB will have a great
deal of discretion in its budget.50 The CFPB Director will request an
amount of funds up to a statutory cap, and the FRB will be required to
comply.51
III. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The Congress that passed Dodd-Frank in July of 2010 changed
in composition during the November 2010 elections. 52 With new lines
drawn, the Congressional response has been colorful and partisan.
Even with the July 21, 2011 finish line in sight,5 4 Republicans kept up
efforts to fetter the CFPB. On May 4, 2011, House and Senate Republi-

46. Id. § 5513.
47. The FSOC is composed of nine voting members from federal agencies, many of
which are prudential regulators (e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission). See FinancialStability Oversight Council Created Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T. OF
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/FSOC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan.
24, 2012).
48. The CFPB shall submit "to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Energy
and Commerce of the House of Representatives, a report, beginning with the session following the designated transfer date. The Bureau may also submit such report to the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate." 12 U.S.C. § 5496.
49. Id. § 5491.
50. Who 's Watching, supra note 25, at 5 (statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 5497.
52. David Jackson, House Results: Republicans Take Control; Boehner Pledges Fresh
Start,

USA

TODAY,

Nov.

2,

2010,

http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2010/ 1/the-house-races/1.
53. See Mike Ferullo, GOP Lawmakers Take First Legislative Steps To Restructure
New Consumer Bureau, BANKING DAILY (BNA), May 10, 2011 [hereinafter GOP Lawmakers].
54. Designated Transfer Date Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
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cans initiated legislation that would confine the CFPB's reach.ss There
are three primary efforts underway.56
A.

ProposedChanges to the Review of CFPB Rulemakings

The proposed changes to the process of reviewing CFPB rulemakings include adjusting the standard for the FSOC to veto CFPB
rulemakings. 57 The new veto standard would be rules that are "inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of United States financial institutions," at which point the FSOC would be required,as opposed to
authorized, to act.58 Additionally, the changes would lower the requirement to overrule CFPB regulations from two-thirds of the FSOC
members to simply a majority of the FSOC.5 9 The vote of the CFPB
Director, who sits on the FSOC, would not count, so the veto threshold
to overrule the CFPB would go from seven out of nine votes to just
five. 60 Finally, the FSOC would be required to take a vote if any FSOC
member objected to a CFPB rule.6 1
1. Purpose for Adjusting the Review of CFPB Rulemakings
Most Republicans in Congress suggest that the CFPB does not
have sufficient input from those who appreciate the need for safety and
soundness protection. 62 Businesses of all types, from credit unions to
small businesses, have supported this proposal. 3 If it passes, the FSOC,
55. GOP Lawmakers, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011,
H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011); see also The Communities First Act of 2011, H.R.
1697, 112th Cong. (2011).
58. H.R. 1315 § 103; see also H.R. 1697.
59. H.R. 1315 § 102.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 3 (statement of Todd Zywicki, George Mason
Univ. Found. Professor of Law) ("Ideally, the entire bureau would be liquidated and sent to
the dust bin of history, and all of its responsibilities sent to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), where they belong.").
63. Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Fin. Protection
Bureau: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals],
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventliD=236392
(statement of Leslie R. Andersen, American Banker Association).
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which is composed of many prudential regulators, would be able to exert its influence in the rulemaking process more easily because only a
simple majority of its members would be required to veto CFPB laws. 64
Also the standard for a veto would be lowered to any CFPB rulemaking
that is "inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of United States
financial institutions." 65 This is to be compared with the current standard, which is any rulemaking that "would put the safety and soundness
of the United States banking system .. . at risk," which the CFPB's critics believe will allow the CFPB to make rules that threaten individual
financial institutions. 66
For example, the American Bankers Association 67 believes that
the systemic risk threshold will invalidate small businesses' risks.68
Regulations that have a disproportionate effect on small community
banks might not put the overall financial system at risk, but they could
still harm the small banks.69 Should the concerns of small businesses go
unnoticed, subsets of the overall market could begin to diminish, which
could impact other parts of the economy. 0 Accordingly, the overall
purpose of these changes is to require more careful consideration for the
effect of CFPB rulemakings on smaller institutions.71
2. Implications of Adjusting the Process of Reviewing CFPB
Rulemakings
Opponents to this change believe that if the standard for vetoing
a rule proposed by the CFPB was lowered from a rule that puts the
banking system at risk to any rule that is inconsistent with the safety and
64. H.R. 1315 § 102-103; see also H.R. 1697.
65. H.R. 1315 § 102-103; see also H.R. 1697 (emphasis added).
66. Legislative Proposals,supra note 63, at 3 (statement of Noah Wilcox, Executive
Committee, Independent Community Bankers of America) (emphasis added).
67. About the American Banker's Association. AMERICAN BANKERS Ass'N,
http://www.aba.com/About+ABA/default.htm ("The American Bankers Association represents banks of all sizes and charters and is the voice for the nation's $13 trillion banking industry and its 2 million employees.") (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
68. Legislative Proposals,supra note 63, at 6 (statement of Leslie R. Andersen, American Banker Association).
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See generally Prudential Regulators, supra note 42 (noting that the proposed
changes to the standard of review for CFPB rulemakings should allow for closer consideration of the interests of smaller financial institutions).
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soundness of financial institutions, the CFPB would be less capable to
act as a counterweight to the federal bank regulators. 72 In the past, federal bank regulators have interpreted safety and soundness to mean protecting profitability for the financial institutions, but that has proven to
be detrimental to consumers and, ultimately, financial institutions because they rely on the consumer.73
It is self-evident that a financial institution that is not profitable
is not safe and sound.74 Consumer protection though, for better or
worse, will often be at odds with certain profitable practices. 75 For instance, predatory lending was a profitable practice for many financial
institutions, but it was at odds with consumer interests, and eventually
the financial institutions suffered as well. 76 Still, the prudential regulators that oversaw the financial institutions leading up to the 2008 crisis
approved these types of practices in the name of protecting safety and
soundness. 77
Since regulators interpreted safety and soundness to mean profitability, the proposal to adjust the standard for the FSOC to veto CFPB
rulemakings to those that are "inconsistent with the safe and sound operations" of financial institutions leaves the CFPB's rulemaking discretion subject to veto if the rule burdens the profitability of U.S. financial
institutions.78 Under that kind of scrutiny and a simple majority veto
threshold, the CFPB would be fairly exposed to the prudential regulators and the interests they protect.79
For example, in 2008, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) asked that the FRB add exceptions to Regulation AA,"
which sought to restrict the ability of credit card issuers to adjust the
rates of their customers.81 The Comptroller asserted that such regula72. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 12 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
73. See id. at 11.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id
77. Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 3 (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
78. See Enhanced,supra note 5, at 11 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center) (emphasis added).
79. See id
80. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 227 (2011).
81. Enhanced,supra note 5, at 13 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
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tion would "raise safety and soundness concerns."82 Congress disagreed, so it passed legislation83 curbing issuers' discretion even further
than the proposed amendments to Regulation AA would have. 84 Under
the proposed standard of review, had the OCC raised this same concern,
it could have prevented the CFPB from finalizing regulations along these lines, even though they have since been deemed fit by Congress.85
Allowing the FSOC to veto CFPB rulemakings more easily is a
step towards allowing profitability interests to subsume consumer interests, but not necessarily a large one. There is wide recognition that the
safety and soundness mandate of prudential regulators sitting on the
FSOC has been at odds with consumer protection goals.86 However, the
CFPB and the prudential regulators must work together, so there must
be a mutual appreciation for the needs of both consumers and financial
institutions. That balance, far more than the process for reviewing
CFPB rulemakings, will determine whether the CFPB functions properly.
B.

ProposedChanges to the CFPB'sLeadership Structure

Another proposed change would reshape the leadership structure
of the CFPB to provide for a five-person commission as opposed to a
single director.8 7 The President would consult the Senate and, with its
consent, name commissioners as well as a principal officer.88 Each
commissioner would serve staggered terms, and only three of them
could align with a particular political party.89

82. Letter from John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, to Jennifer Johnson,
Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Bd. 1 (Aug. 18, 2008).
83. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 § 101,
15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1 (2006).
84. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
85. See id.at 13-14.
86. See Who's Watching, supra note 25, at 10 (statement of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
87. See Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, H.R.
1121, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
88. H.R. 1121 § 2(c).
89. Id.
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1. Purpose of Changing the CFPB's Leadership Structure
Support for this proposal has been divided along partisan lines. 90
Republicans in Congress take issue with the structure of the CFPB and
support changing its leadership format to match that of other independent federal agencies. 9' Indeed, there are many agencies that have three
or five person commissions.92 In fact, as originally envisioned, the
CFPB was to adopt the commission model, but the Senate introduced
the single director model in the final stages of the Bill's implementation.93 The commission model has been credited with encouraging impartial decision-making, and since the CFPB will have control over
technical matters, collaborative consideration will be important to ensure that a variety of viewpoints make their way into the deliberations
leading up to agency action. 94
Another concern associated with a single-director model is the
risk of regulatory capture. 95 Rachel E. Barkow, professor of law at
NYU, observed that "having only one person at the apex can ... mean
that the agency is more easily captured."9 6 Simply stated, special interests cannot capture the attention of a multimember bipartisan commission as easily as they can capture a single person. 97
Finally, a single-director's departure could produce a disruptive
effect on the CFPB. 98 The leaders for agencies generally acquire the

90. Many Democrats in Congress believe that this proposal is intended to weaken the
CFPB's mission, but their Republican counterparts disagree. GOP Lawmakers, supra note
53.
91. See Legislative Proposals, supra note 63, at 7 (statement of U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
92. E.g., the FTC, SEC, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Credit Union Administration, the National
Transportation Safety Board, etc. Id.
93. Id.
94. Donald Lamson, a former OCC official, noted that a commission's structural advantages include a "healthy minority expressing a viewpoint. . . ." Joe Adler, Director Vs.
Board: Does An Agency's Structure Really Matter, AM. BANKER, Oct. 17, 2011.
95. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REv. 15 (2010).
96. Id. at 38.
97. Id.
98. Adler, supra note 94 ("One current example is the FDIC, where the departure of
board members - including former Chairman Sheila Blair - have left the board with just
three out of five seats filled.").
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wherewithal and knowledge to fulfill their duties over the course of a
few years. 99 If left in the hands of a single director, the CFPB and the
institutions it regulates could be left in a period of uncertainty while a
new director obtains the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively
govern. 100 By contrast, a bipartisan panel with staggered terms ensures
a constant presence of commissioners with experience and diverse
backgrounds.101 The potential for disruptive departures and political
overhaul is thus undermined.'02
2. Implications of Changing the CFPB's Leadership Structure
There are important reasons to leave the commission under a
unitary directorship. It is not clear, from an academic standpoint, which
leadership model is most effective in federal agencies.1 03 There are
trade-offs involved, but in the context of consumer protection, the merits of a single-director structure are more persuasive than those associated with multimember commissions.1 04 Although commissions do more
readily lend themselves to collaboration and intellectual diversity, those
values come at a cost. 05
For instance, there is little accountability or efficiency under the
multimember commission structure, and to the extent that there is bipartisanship, it is often only in name as the majority's views nearly always
eclipse those of the minority.106 The CFPB's structure should promote
action because regulatory lethargy played a significant role in the 2008

99. Legislative Proposals, supra note 63, at 9 (statement of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 10.
102. Id.
103. Adler, supra note 94 ("There's no proven form of governmental organization that
transcends either history or human frailty .... We've seen powerful, potent boards, and
completely incompetent ones.") (quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner at Federal
Financial Analytics).
104. Enhanced,supra note 5, at 9-10 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
105. Adler, supra note 94 (stating that some agencies have struggled with infighting between board members, such as "the Federal Housing Finance Board, which was eliminated
in 2008 after years of sometimes openly hostile conflicts between the chairman and other
board members.").
106. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 10 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
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crisis. 107 If the CFPB is to help prevent the need for hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer bailouts, its structure needs to facilitate efficient and accountable decision-making.' 08 The single director structure
is the best means to that end.
Regulatory capture is a real concern, but more so with respect to
the large financial institutions, which have gained so much influence
that regulation appears to have become slanted heavily in their favor,
and less so with respect to consumer advocates, who have not been as
effective. 109 Capture is a problem for agencies regardless of their leadership structure. 10 The system requires that agencies rely on frequent
and deep interaction with the interests they protect, and it is unrealistic
to think that a change in leadership structure alone would curb that influence."' More effective measures include: enabling participation in
the regulatory process from a broader group of interests; reducing the
scale of larger interest groups; and relying more heavily on independent
consultative and review bodies. 112
One of the downsides to the commission structure is the political haggling that will inevitably occur when addressing issues. 113 Under
the single-director design, an issue may rise and fall on its own, without
incorporating peripheral issues promoted by various commissioners
looking to make a deal.1 4 The single directorship curbs that bargaining
and allows agencies to tackle issues on their individual merits." 5
Further complicating the commission model is the adversarial
Senate confirmation process. 116 The CFPB directorship was vacant for
months"l 7 due to opposition from Senate Republicans, more than forty

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" In FinancialRegulation: Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 191-92 (2011).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 10 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. On Jan. 4, 2011, President Obama recess appointed Richard Cordray to head the
CFPB. Many speculate that politics motivated both the prior Congressional block of
Cordray and his recess appointment. Kevin Wack, How Politics Shaped Obama's CFPB
Decision, AM. BANKER, Jan. 5, 2012.
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of whom had vowed to block Richard Cordray's nomination without
questioning his qualifications." 8 This process not only blocks nominations, but it also dampens potential nominations."9 The political deadlock associated with the confirmation process 120 poses a serious threat to
the modem administrative state because the process has become so dysfunctional that federal agencies are left without directors, commissioners, or even quorums.121 In the last few years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the
National Labor Relations Board have all gone through periods of paralysis due to the absence of a quorum. 122 Since five confirmations are
harder to attain than one, the CFPB would be more exposed to a process
that is flawed and destabilizing under the proposed leadership changes. 123
Those who support changing the CFPB leadership structure
have referred to lists of other agencies with multiple-person commissions, 124 but one of the federal financial regulators is notably absent
from those lists: the OCC.125 The OCC is the most powerful of the prudential regulators, and it has a single director as well as independent
funding.126 This structure has enabled the OCC to be an effective advocate for the national banks. 127 It has eschewed all of the inefficiencies

118. Cheryl Bolen & Mike Ferullo, Consumer Protection: White House Intensifies Effort to Confirm Cordray to CFPB Post; GOP Opposition Strong, BANKING DAILY (BNA),
Dec. 6, 2011.
119. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 10 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
120. The Senate's confirmation process has become so problematic that a bipartisan
group of Senators has introduced a bill that would cut back on the number of executive
branch positions that require confirmation by the Senate. See Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, S. 679, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
121. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 10 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Legislative Proposals, supra note 63, at 7 (statement of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
125. Adler, supra note 94 (noting that two financial regulators, the Federal Housing
Agency and the OCC, are both led by individual directors).
126. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 11 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
127. Id.
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and haggling associated with multiple-person commissions and operates
with an efficiency and conclusiveness that only exists under the unitary

directorship model. 128
This structure and influence remain intact to this day. For example, even after Dodd-Frank, the OCC has been able to use preemption to stifle states' efforts to enforce local consumer protection laws
against national banks. 129 It is uncommon for federal agencies to comment on another regulator's proposal.130 Thus, when the Treasury Department objected to the preemption standard proposed by the OCC,13 '
insisting that enactment of Dodd-Frank effectively compelled national
banks to comply with more state consumer protection laws, many
thought the OCC would take a step back.132 Instead, the OCC left its
proposal intact, and so far, courts are enforcing this stance. 33
The CFPB was intended to be ballast for the OCC to allow consumer protection concerns to run parallel with profitability (i.e., safety
and soundness) concerns.134 This balance is the best way to prevent the
problems linked with subordination of consumer protection to profitability, and it requires that the CFPB have a single director, like the
OCC, as opposed to the commission structure proposed.
C.

ProposedChanges to the CFPB'sFunding

Another major overhaul would subject the CFPB budget to the
Congressional appropriations process.13 5 The FRB would no longer be
obligated to comply with the requests of the CFPB.136 Instead, the
128. Id.
129. Kate Davidson, Post Dodd-Frank,PreemptionFight Still FavoringBankers, BANK
INv. CONSULTANT (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.bankinvestmentconsultant.com/news/dodd[hereinafter Post Dodd-Frank,
frank-banks-consumer-protection-laws-2675345-1.html
Preemption Fight].
130. Id.
131. See Letter from George Madison, U.S. Treasury Gen. Counsel, to John Walsh, Dir.
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 27, 2011) (on file with author).
132. Post Dodd-Frank,PreemptionFight,supra note 129.
133. Id. ("A federal judge in Iowa ruled that the Dodd-Frank Act did not materially
change the standard for federal preemption. It was the second such decision of 2011, following a ruling by a Florida appellate court in May.").
134. Enhanced,supra note 5, at 11-12 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
135. Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, S. 737, 112th
Cong. §3 (2011).
136. See S. 737 § 3 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (Supp. IV 2010)).
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CFPB would explain its budgetary needs to Congress, which would then
make its own determination as to the validity of the CFPB's budgetary
needs. 137
1. Purpose of Changing the CFPB's Funding
The purpose of this proposed change is to use the power of the
purse to hold the CFPB accountable to Congress.138 Notably, this
change would expose the CFPB, but none of the other federal bank regulators, to the Congressional appropriations process for funding.139 The
federal bank regulators receive funding outside the appropriations process in a variety of ways: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) receives its revenue from fees on deposit insurance; the OCC
generates funds from bank assessments; the FRB receives funding by
creating money in the reserve banks and collecting the interest on resulting reserve balances.1 40 More importantly, unlike the prudential regulators, the CFPB's budget is already restricted by a statutory cap.141
2. Implications of Changing the CFPB's Funding
If left in Congress's hands, the CFPB's mission would be at the
whim of Congressional politics and could be hampered by a minority in
either house.14 2 The Congressional appropriations process's effects on
agency discretion have been apparent in a number of contexts. 143 As an

137.

See id.

138. Press Release, Jerry Moran, Sen. Moran Introduces Bill to Reform Consumer Fin.
Protection Bureau (Apr. 6, 2011), http://moran.senate.gov/public/index.cfin/newsreleases?ContentRecord id=18419a98-8ee4-4b84-80cd-52cf6043368d.
139. Mark W. Olson, Expect a CFPB Compromise That Will Please Neither Camp, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 11, 2011.
140. Id.
141. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center); see also Olson, supra 139 ("The CFPB's funding,
which is paid in quarterly installments, is an initial 10% of the operating budget of the Fed,
rising by 12% by 2013.").
142. See Roland E. Brandel, History Shows Why CFPB Needs a Commission, AM.
BANKER: BANK THINK, Oct. 19, 2011; Enhanced, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Adam
Levitin, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center) ("[I]f bank regulators'
budgets were subject to the appropriations process, the agencies' effectiveness and thus the
President's Constitutional obligation to enforce federal laws could be held hostage by a minority in either house of Congress.").
143. See Brandel, supra note 142.
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example, in the 1970s Congress refused to provide the funds requested
by the FTC for regulating financial services and instead shut down the
FTC for days in response to the requests.14 4 Afterwards, Congress restricted the FTC's authority to regulate financial services for fourteen
years. 4 5 As noted by former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC, Howard Beales, "[t]hus, chastened, the Commission
abandoned most of its rule making initiatives."l 46 There is no reason to
think the CFPB would not meet a similar fate under the appropriations
process.
Additionally, subjecting the CFPB budget to the appropriations
process would emasculate the agency because federal budgets are complex and often involve political horse-trading, which would make consumer protection a mere bargaining chip amongst many other considerations in an already-tight federal budget.147 If that were to be the case, it
would be a failure to recognize the need for government to protect consumers the same way it protected financial institutions leading up to the
2008 crisis. Hence, such proposed changes to the CFPB budget should
be rejected.
IV. WHY THE CFPB SHOULD NOT BE WEAKENED

Reactions to these proposed changes have been mixed and vociferous, but the implications of weakening the CFPB, the ultimate result if not objective' 4 of these proposals, are worth considering.
A.

FailuresUnder the Old System

Although the CFPB has no history, there is reliable data demonstrating the implications of subordinating consumer protection to safety
and soundness in the administrative context. In the pre-CFPB regulatory
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
148. Kate Davidson, CordrayHearing Devolves into PartisanFight Over CFPB Structure, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 2011 ("The misleading claim of no CFPB accountabilitydrummed up by special interests and put forth by a vocal minority-should be expressed for
what it is: an attempt to destroy the bureau's ability to do its job of protecting American
consumers.") (quoting Tim Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee).
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climate, consumer protection was essentially where the proposed
changes would position it: at the mercy of the prudential regulators'
agenda. 149 Ten different federal agencies were supposed to enforce federal consumer financial protection laws, but it was not a primary mission for any of them.150 Three of those ten agencies proved to be especially ineffective when it came to protecting consumers: the FRB, the
OCC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which today is a part
of the OCC.' 5 1 Each of these agencies that still exists is a voting member of the FSOC.152 A review of their records not only demonstrates the
effect of subordinating consumer protection in the administrative agenda, but also serves as a good indication of where these agencies' loyalties will lie as FSOC members.
In 1994, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) bestowed on the FRB the authority to police the mortgage
market and protect it from unfair and deceptive acts and practices. 153 In
2000, consumer advocates exhorted the FRB to proscribe, among other
abusive practices, prepayment penalties on mortgages with aboveaverage interest rates.154 The FRB did not act until July of 2008, but by
that time, it was too late to curtail the foreclosures, which contributed to
the 2008 crisis. 5 5 Had the FRIB been more sensitive to the warnings
from consumer advocates, many of those foreclosures could have been
prevented.156
The OCC is another example of an agency that gave little
weight to its oversight role. In the late 1990s, many states enacted antipredatory lending laws, which were supposed to protect homeowners

149. See Enhanced, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for
Responsible Lending).
150. Id. at 2 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center).
151. Id. at 3-5 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for Responsible Lending).
152. See Financial Stability Oversight Council Created Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T. OF
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/FSOC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan.
24, 2012).
153. Truth in Lending Act § 129, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006).
154. Press Release, Testimony of Martin Eakes, CEO, Ctr. for Cmty. Self-Help, Before
the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv. on Predatory Mortg. Lending (May 24, 2000),
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/banking/52400eak.shtml.
155. Enhancedsupra note 5, at 2 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for Responsible Lending).
156. Cf id.
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and preserve a sound market.' 57 Simultaneously however, the OCC
preempted many of these state laws.158 The result not only was to exempt federally chartered banks from these regulations, but also to occasion the argument from state chartered banks that it would not be fair to
subject them to these regulations when their national bank counterparts
could preempt their application.'5 9 Consequently, the state lawmaking
effort lost momentum, and banks, both state and national, were left
playing by their own rules.160 The OCC did not believe such antipredatory regulations were necessary.' 6 1 Even when expressly warned
about predatory lending practices,1 62 the OCC repeatedly denied that
such practices existed amongst the nationally chartered banks.163 If the
OCC had been more responsive to the voice of consumers, it might have
exercised its oversight authority and prevented the ruinous practices that
it instead refused to acknowledge.
Finally, the OTS's failure to respond to consumer interests became apparent in a number of contexts.' 64 For example, NetBank, a
Georgia based company that provided internet banking services, failed
under the watch of the OTS, costing shareholders and consumers
alike.165 The OTS had sufficient data indicating that NetBank had un157. See Gary Whalen, The Wealth Effects of OCC PreemptionAnnouncements After
the Passageof the GeorgiaFairLending Act 6 (OCC Econ. Working Paper No. 2004-4).
158. See id. at 9.
159. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for
Responsible Lending).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's Rules on National Bank Preemption and VisitorialPowers: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs,
108th
Cong.
31
(2004),
available
at
http:/ibanking.senate.gov/public/index.cfmn?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=0a
ae2beb-535f-4c3e-9193-cla632acl6b2 (statement of Martin Eakes, CEO, Self-Help Credit
Union and the Center for Responsible Lending) ("Abusive practices may well be profitable
in the short term, but are ticking time bombs waiting to explode the safety and soundness of
national banks in the years ahead. The OCC has not only done a tremendous disservice to
hundreds of thousands of borrowers, but has also sown the seeds for future stress on the
banking system.").
163. Press Release, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Statement of
Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding the Issuance of Regulations
Concerning
Preemption
and
Visitorial
Powers
(Jan.
7,
2004),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/2004-3aComptrollersstatement.pdf ("We have no evidence that
national banks (or their subsidiaries) are engaged in such practices to any discernible degree.").
164. Enhanced, supra note 5, at 4 (statement of Mike Calhoun, President, Center for
Responsible Lending).
165. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-08-032, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS:
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acceptable levels of credit risk, inordinately high general and administrative expenses, as well as a host 66 of other problems.167 Then, when
the mortgage market began to recede, NetBank attempted to maintain its
loan production levels by loosening its underwriting standards despite
indications at the time that this practice was detrimental to both consumers and investors. 168 The OTS opted to rely on NetBank's management's assurances that it could address these problems.' 6 9 After the
OTS had responded too late for it to matter, its management explained
why their intervention was so delayed, stating that NetBank management did not seem to be engaging in practices that were unsafe or unsound.17 0
Each of these agencies was on notice as to practices that were
affecting consumers negatively, but all three failed to act for a number
of reasons. Foremost, they subordinated consumer protection interests
to safety and soundness. Proposals to weaken the CFPB likely would
leave the concerns of consumers subsidiary to the safety and soundness
concerns of prudential regulators. That scenario is a familiar one, and
the results are both recent and apparent. If not for the sake of selfpreservation then for the sake of ingenuity, it seems that it is time for a
different approach.
B.

Inter-Agency Comparison

As discussed, those in favor of weakening the CFPB tend to
point to other agency models to demonstrate that the CFPB has far too
much discretion. However, a side-by-side comparison of the CFPB
with the other financial regulators reveals that it is not markedly more
or less accountable than others.17'
The FRB, OCC, FDIC, FTC, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the CFPB all are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act and must adhere to notice-and-comment procedures for ruleMATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF NETBANK, FSB (2008).

166. NetBank also had continually changing business plans and budgeting failures that
had been noted by OTS. Id. at 23.
167. Id at 22.
168. Id at 24.
169. Id. at 22.
170. Id. at 27.
171. Enhanced, supra note, at 6-8 (statement of Adam Levitin, Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center).
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making and adjudication. 172 Although the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs reviews economically significant regulations promulgated by the OCC and FTC, it conducts small business impact reviews
of only the CFPB.17 3 Furthermore, all of these agencies operate under
Congressional oversight.174
There is not much that sets the CFPB apart from the prudential
regulators in terms of the checks and balances put in place. The CFPB
will be able to restrain and monitor the offering of deleterious financial
products, but it will not be able to compel financial institutions to offer
any certain type of product.1 75 This kind of oversight is long overdue,
and the system of accountability put in place will be sufficient to keep
the CFPB from interfering with the safety and soundness of financial
institutions.
V. CONCLUSION

The partisan disagreement over how functional consumer protection should take shape has produced a contentious debate that has
helped shape the CFPB, but the time for debate is over.176 While the
proposal to change the review of CFPB rulemakings is of less consequence, the proposed changes to the CFPB's leadership and budget only
delay the progress that many Americans desire.177 A compromise is appropriate but may not be possible in the current political climate.
Businesses of all types have agencies and lobbyists representing
their interests, but many consumers are disenfranchised by comparison.
The consequences of leaving these interests towards the bottom of the
regulatory agenda, to be protected by almost a dozen agencies with other priorities, became apparent in the fallout of the 2008 crisis. Today

172. Id. at 6.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer FinancialProtectionAgency: Pew FinancialReform Project, Briefing Paper #2 15 (Georgetown Law, Faculty Working Papers, No.
1447082, 2009).
177. See Lydia Saad, Among Recent Bills, FinancialReform a Lone Plus for Congress,
Gallup (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142967/Among-Recent-Bills-Financial-Reform-Lone-PlusCongress.aspx (finding that sixty-one percent of Americans approve of financial reform legislation including the CFPB).
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many people still feel their concerns go unnoticed." 8
Additionally, financial product pricing structure has become so
complicated to the average consumer that comparison-shopping is nearly impossible, and commoditization diminishes as a result.179 Proponents and critics alike recognize that consumer financial services regulation must rely on markets as the primary indicator of the state of
consumers' interests, but for these markets to function properly, financial institutions and consumers must both be heard. 80 For the CFPB to
assist in obtaining this balance, it must have the same toolkit that has
enabled the prudential regulators to protect profitability for financial institutions (i.e., a unitary directorship, a discretionary budget, etc.). To
dampen the consumer's voice before it has a chance to make an impact
would restore the status quo. To do this and expect different results
than those witnessed in 2008 would be impractical.
ALEC C. COVINGTON

178. This perceived disenfranchisement has culminated with a group of people, known
as Occupy Wall Street, taking to the streets in recent months to voice their sometimesamorphous grievances. Still, despite their chaotic structure, the protestors have targeted
Wall Street because, among other reasons, they feel that there is a disproportionate amount
of political capital behind profitability interests. See Mike McCready, What is "Occupy
Wall Street" Really About?, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2011, 3:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-mccready/occupy-wall-street-b_1028155.html.
179. Levitin, supra note 176, at 14.
180.

Id. at 2.

